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Abstract
Due to lack of models that can feature both output- and input-inventories
simultaneously, several well known puzzles pertaining to inventory ﬂuctu-
ations and the business cycle have not been well explained by dynamic
optimization theory. By presenting a general equilibrium, multi-stage pro-
duction model of inventories with separate decisions to order, use, and stock
input materials and to produce, sell, and store ﬁnished output, this paper
oﬀers not only a model of input-output inventories but also a neoclassical
perspective on the theory of aggregate demand. It shows that due to pro-
duction/delivery lags, ﬁrms opt to hold both output- and input-inventories
so as to guard against demand uncertainty at all stages of production. As
a result, not only is production more volatile than sales but also is input-
ordering more volatile than input-usages, giving rise to a chain-multiplier
∗I would like to thank Karl Shell, Gaetano Antinolﬁ, Steve Fazzari, Patrick Pintus and
seminar participants at Cornell/Penn State Macro conference, Marseilles University in France,
and Washongton University at St. Louis for comments.mechanism that propagates and ampliﬁes demand shocks at downstream
towards upstream via input-output linkages. This multiplier eﬀect induced
by precautionary inventory investment at each production stage can ex-
plain several long-standing puzzles of the business cycle documented in the
inventory literature.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E22, E23, E32.
Keywords: Input Inventory, Multi-Stage-Fabrication, Multiplier, Busi-
ness Cycle.
21. Introduction
Given the sheer magnitude of volatility in inventory investment and its dispro-
portionately large contribution to output ﬂuctuations, it is fair to say that un-
derstanding inventory behavior constitutes the ultimate frontier of business cycle
research.1 There are three long-standing puzzles associated with inventory be-
havior: 1) output production is more variable than output sales — suggesting that
inventory investment is procyclical with respect to sales; 2) input orders are more
variable than input usages; and 3) input inventories — deﬁned here as raw materi-
als and work-in-progress — are essentially uncorrelated with, yet far more volatile
than output inventories.2 While there is no shortage in supply of explanations for
the ﬁrst puzzle, the literature on resolving the second and third puzzle is remark-
ably thin, despite the fact that more than two thirds of total inventory investment
in the US is contributed by input inventories (e.g., see Blinder and Maccini, 1991).
The three prominent features of production and inventory behavior are puz-
zling because we usually think that a ﬁrm has not only an incentive to smooth
production in order to reduce production costs when facing uncertainty in out-
put sales, but also an incentive to smooth input production/orders when factor-
demand/input-usage is also uncertain. Furthermore, because output inventories
are far more liquid and hence far more eﬀective than input inventories in meeting
uncertain ﬁnished-goods demand, it is apparently not proﬁt maximizing for ﬁrms
to keep most inventories in the form of raw materials and work-in-progress rather
than in the form of ﬁnished output.
This paper conjectures that time lags involved in production/delivery at each
stage of a input-output chain of production could be the prime culprit in ex-
plaining these puzzles. In any economy the ultimate goal of production is al-
ways to meet ﬁnal consumption demand, regardless how many intermediate stages
there are or how “round-about” the production process is. Because of produc-
tion/delivery lags, however, output must be produced in advance before demand
uncertainty is resolved and input must be ordered in advance before production
takes place. Hence, to avoid stockouts, it is conceivable that proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms
opt to hold inventories at each stage of the production process in order to fully
1Inventory investment accounts for only less than one percent of GNP in mean yet the drop
in inventory investment has accounted for 87 percent of the drop in GNP during the average
postwar recession in the United States (e.g., see Blinder and Maccini, 1991).
2E.g., see Blinder (1986), Feldstein and Auerbach (1976), and Humphreys, Maccini and
Schuh (2001).
3guard against demand uncertainty. This may result in a precautionary motive for
inventory investment in both output and input. Precautionary inventory accu-
mulation may cause production to be more volatile than sales on the output side,
and orders to be more volatile than usage on the input side. Hence, uncertainty
in ﬁnal demand at the downstream may be transmitted backwards to upstream
industries and during the transmission the uncertainty in demand may be even
magniﬁed repeatedly at each stage of the production chain, as the input demand
of one ﬁrm is also the output sales of another ﬁrm.
I set up a general-equilibrium, rational-expectations, multi-stage-fabrication
model of production to put this conjecture to scrutiny. I show that with pro-
duction (or delivery) lags at each stage of production, uncertainty in demand
at the downstream indeed generates a motive for holding both output and in-
put inventories by all upstream ﬁrms in order to avoid possible stockouts. Such
am o t i v ei ss u ﬃcient for explaining the existence of both ﬁnal-goods invento-
ries and intermediate-goods inventories at all stages of production observed in
the actual economy. Furthermore, if shocks to ﬁnal consumption demand at the
downstream are serially correlated (i.e., they are forecastable to certain degree),
then production/orders become more variable than sales/usages, which may cause
the volatility of economic activities to increase towards upstream ﬁrms. Conse-
quently, the variance in consumption demand is not only propagated backwards
to upstream industries via input-output linkages, but also ampliﬁed repeatedly
along the production chain. This explains why in the US the variance of produc-
tion at upstream industries is usually about 50 percent larger than the variance
of production at downstream industries.3
It has long been well known that input inventories are far larger and more
volatile than ﬁnished goods inventories (e.g., see Feldstein and Auerbach, 1976).
Despite this, yet the vast bulk of theoretical work in the inventory literature has
focused almost exclusively on ﬁnished goods inventories (e.g., see Abel, 1985;
Amihud and Mendelson, 1983; Bils and Kahn, 2000; Blinder, 1986; Blinder and
Maccini, 1991; Kahn, 1987, 1992; Karlin and Carr, 1962; Maccini and Zabel,
3For example, according to monthly US production data for manufacturing sector (1960:01
- 1995:12), the variance of growth rate of production for raw materials is 0.00014 and that for
intermediate goods is 0.00009, implying a variance ratio of 1.6. Similarly, according to monthly
US data for housing sector (1968:01 - 1996:08), the variance of housing starts in total units is
130321 and the variance of housing completion in total units is 80770, implying a variance ratio
of 1.6.
41996; Reagan, 1982; and Scheinkman and Schechtman, 1983; among others).4 As
a consequence of neglecting input inventories, the role of inventories in amplifying
and propagating the business cycle has not been well understood.
This paper is a ﬁrst step towards understanding and modeling input- and
output-inventory behavior simultaneously in general equilibrium. By extending
the partial equilibrium, single-stage fabrication model of Kahn (1987) to a general
equilibrium, multi-stage fabrication model with separate decisions to order, use,
and stock input materials and to produce, sell, and store ﬁnished goods, it pro-
vides a theoretical foundation for the important empirical works of Feldstein and
Auerbach (1976), Ramey (1989), and especially Humphreys, Maccini and Schuh
(2001). In doing so, it oﬀers not only a model of input-output inventories but
also a new perspective on the theory of aggregate demand and the propagation
of the business cycle. The neoclassical theory reveals not only that small distur-
bances to ﬁnal demand can generate potentially large aggregate ﬂuctuations via a
chain-multiplier induced by precautionary inventory investment, but also that the
multiplier mechanism reﬂects optimal responses of a perfectly functioning market
economy towards exogenous uncertainty. Hence, although inventory investment
appears to be highly destabilizing, government interventions attempting to reduce
the volatility of aggregate output via distortionary monetary or ﬁscal policies may
prove counter-productive, unless they are able to target speciﬁcally on reducing
the demand uncertainty and lags involved in ﬁrms’ production decisions.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 derives equilibrium decision rules. Section 4 analyzes the empirical
implications of the model for inventory ﬂuctuations and the business cycle. Section
5 concludes the paper.
4This is also true for much empirical work on inventories, most notably, see Blanchard (1983),
Eichenbaum (1984, 1989), Ramey (1991) and West (1986).
5This, however, by no means implies that in the real world all government interventions are
necessarily undesirable since market failures may exacerbate the neoclassical multiplier eﬀect of
inventories. But the neoclassical theory does show the potential danger of policy interventions
based solely on output volatilities.
52. A General Equilibrium Model of Input and Output In-
ventories
Consider an economy similar to that described by Humphreys, Maccini, and Schuh
(2001) in which most ﬁrms produce goods in stages. A typical ﬁrm orders input
materials from an upstream supplier and uses them to produce intermediate goods,
which are combined with other factor inputs to produce ﬁnished goods. Many
ﬁrms sell their ﬁnished goods to downstream ﬁrms as input materials. Figure 1
presents a schematic illustration of the model (a near replication of Humphreys,
Maccini, and Schuh, 2001). The diagram focuses on ﬂows through the multi-stage-
production process employed by a representative agent (or planner) to transform
raw materials (or labor) into intermediate goods inventories (or work-in-progress)
and then further into output inventories (ﬁnished goods) to meet ﬁnal demand
of consumer (or another downstream ﬁrm). More precisely, at the beginning of
ap e r i o d ,s a yt − 2 ,b a s e do ne x p e c t e df u t u r ed e m a n df o rﬁnished goods (c)t h e
agent orders raw materials (n) in order to produce intermediate goods (y2). Since
production takes one period, y2 is not available until period t − 1. In this next
period, based on updated information about ﬁnal demand (c) the agent decides
how much of the intermediate goods to be kept as inventories (s2) and how much
of them (in the amount m) to be combined with other factor inputs (such as l)
to produce ﬁnished goods (y1). Again due to time lags in production, y1 is not
available until period t. In this period, the uncertainty in ﬁnal demand for ﬁnished
goods (c) is resolved, the agent then decides on how much of the ﬁnished goods
to be kept as output inventories (s1) and how much to be consumed (c).
This economy can be easily decentralized or mapped to a competitive market
economy in which consumers choose labor supply and ﬁnal demand given mar-
k e tp r i c e sf o ro u t p u ta n df a c t o rp a y m e n t s ,a n dd o w n s t r e a mﬁrms choose orders,
usages, and storages of intermediated goods, as well as production and inventory
investment in ﬁnished goods given expected prices of ﬁnished goods and input
materials. Upstream suppliers choose production of intermediate goods and de-
mand for raw materials given expected output price for intermediate goods and
input price for raw materials. More stages of production can be added easily if
needed.
In this paper I adopt the representative agent version of the model (by the
welfare theorems, competitive-market interpretations are also applied to enhance
understanding), in which a social planner chooses consumption plan (c), supply
6of raw materials and labor (n,l), input usages for intermediate goods (m), and
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subject to resource constraints in the ﬁnished goods market and the intermediate
goods market (denoting δj as the depreciation rate for inventory type j):
ct + s1t ≤ y1t +( 1− δ1)s1t−1
mt + s2t ≤ y2t +( 1− δ2)s2t−1
production technologies for ﬁnished goods and intermediate goods:
y1t = f(mt,l t)
y2t = g(nt)




The operator Ej in the objective function denotes expectation based on informa-
tion available in period j,a n dθ in the utility function represents random shifts in
consumption demand (preference shocks) and it is assumed to follows a stationary
AR(1) process:
θt = γ + ρθt−1 + εt,
where ε is i.i.d with zero mean.
To ensure that θ represents genuine demand shocks that aﬀect consumption
goods demand only, linear utility functions in terms of the costs of leisure (labor
supply), wl+an, are adopted following Hansen’s (1985) indivisible labor model, so
that the marginal cost of labor supply is constant and hence θ does not shift labor
supply curves. Consequently, equilibrium employment in this model is determined
solely by labor demand which responds to changes in output demand or output
prices.
7In order to yield simple closed-form solutions, it is also assumed that the utility






and that the two production functions satisfy constant returns to scale:
g(n)=n
f(m,l)=m i n{m,l}.
That is, one unit of raw materials (labor n) can be transformed into one unit
of intermediate goods at the marginal cost of a, and one unit of intermediate
goods (m) can be combined with one unit of labor (l) to be transformed into one
unit of consumption goods at the marginal cost of w +λm,w h e r eλm denotes the
shadow price (Lagrangian multiplier) of intermediate goods. The shadow price
(Lagrangian multiplier) of ﬁnal goods is simply the marginal utility of consump-
tion, λc = θ − c. For simplicity without loss of generality, I assume that the
depreciation rates for both types of inventory goods are zero, δ1 = δ2 =0 .N o t i c e
that in equilibrium both forms of inventories may coexist, because without know-
ing precisely the ﬁnal demand of consumers the planner may opt not to transform
all the intermediate goods inventories into ﬁnished goods inventories if the ex-
pected demand for ﬁn i s h e dg o o d sn e x tp e r i o di sl o w .T h i sc a np o s t p o n et h el a b o r
cost of producing ﬁnished goods.
The ﬁrst order conditions for optimal plans for the variables {c,s1,m,s 2,n}
are given respectively by (note: cost minimization by downstream ﬁrms implies
l = m):

























plus two market clearing conditions,
ct + s1t = y1t + s1t−1 (6)
6This assumption is not necessary for closed-form solutions but it simpliﬁes expressions.
8y1t + s2t = y2t + s2t−1 (7)
and two complementary slackness (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions associated with the






t s2t =0 .
Equation (1) says that the optimal consumption level is chosen to the point where
the marginal utility of consumption equals its marginal cost (the shadow price of
ﬁnished goods). Equation (2) says that the optimal inventory holding of ﬁnished
goods inventories is chosen to the point such that the cost of obtaining one extra
unit of inventory (the shadow price of ﬁnished goods) equals the discounted beneﬁt
of having one extra unit of inventory available next period (βEtλc
t+1)p l u st h e
value gained by relaxing the slackness constraint (πc). Equation (3) says that
the optimal level of production for ﬁn i s h e dg o o d si sc h o s e nb a s e do ni n f o r m a t i o n
available in period t − 1 to the point where the marginal cost of production
(w+λm
t ) — both labor and material costs — equals the expected value of marginal
product (Et−1λc
t). Equation (4) says that the optimal level of intermediate goods
inventory is chosen such that the cost of obtaining one extra unit of intermediate-
goods inventory (λm) equals the discounted beneﬁto fh a v i n go n ee x t r au n i to fs u c h
inventory available next period (βEt−1λm
t+1) plus the value gained by relaxing the
slackness constraint (πm). Equation (5) says that the optimal level of production
for intermediate goods is chosen based on information in period t−2t ot h ep o i n t
so that the marginal input cost for raw materials (a) equals the expected value of
marginal product (Et−2λm
t ).
3. Deriving Equilibrium Decision Rules
Given output price (λc
t) and the availability of ﬁnished goods (y1t +s1t−1)a sw e l l
as the realized demand shocks (θ)a tt h eb e g i n n i n go fp e r i o dt, the planner chooses
consumption (ct) and inventory holdings (s1t) to maximize utility. Consider two
possible cases:
Case A1. The demand shock is below “normal”, hence the existing supply
(y1t + s1t−1)i ss u ﬃcient to meet the utility maximizing level of consumption
demand. In this case, we have s1t ≥ 0a n dπc
t = 0. Equation (2) implies that the
shadow price of ﬁn i s h e dg o o d si sac o n s t a n t ,λc
t = ¯ λ, implying that goods price
9is endogenously downward sticky when inventories are allowed.7 The intuition
for this result is straightforward. From the point of view of the representative
agent, a low θ implies a low marginal utility of consumption. Hence it is optimal
not to consume now but to hold the excess supply as inventories so as to be
able to consume more in the future when θ maybe high. Translating this into
the language of a competitive market economy, this implies that when demand is
low, although ﬁrms can potentially dump all excess supply (inventory holdings)
in the market to push down equilibrium price, this is not proﬁt maximizing since
inventories would be sold at equilibrium price below marginal cost. Hence it is
optimal not to sell excess supply but to hold them into the future when market
price or demand becomes high. This results in equilibrium market price being
not responsive to changes in demand when demand lies below certain threshold
level (as inventories eﬀectively render the supply curve perfectly elastic), oﬀering
a plausible explanation for price stickiness (see Blinder, 1982, for more discussions
and references therein on this point).
Equation (1) then implies that the optimal consumption level is given by
ct = θt − ¯ λ,
and equation (6) implies that the optimal level of inventory holdings is given by
s1t = y1t + s1t−1 − θt + ¯ λ.
Since s1t ≥ 0, the threshold preference shock determining that the economy is in
case A1 is then given by y1t + s1t−1 − θt + ¯ λ ≥ 0o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,b y
θt ≤ y1t + s1t−1 + ¯ λ.
Case B1. The demand shock is above “normal”, and the existing goods supply
(y1t +s1t−1) falls short in meeting the consumption demand. In this case we have
s1t =0a n dπc
t > 0. The optimal consumption policy is then to consume the
entire stock given by the right-hand side of equation (6),
ct = y1t + s1t−1.
Notice that the probability distribution of case A1 and case B1 (i.e., the prob-
ability of stocking out in period t) depends not only on demand shocks but also
7See Samuelson (1971) and Deaton and Laroque (1996) for a similar result in a slightly
diﬀerent context.
10on the supply (production) level of ﬁnished goods (y1) determined in period t−1.
To choose y1t optimally in period t − 1 without knowing the demand shock in
period t,e q u a t i o n( 3 )s h o w st h a ty1t should be chosen such that the marginal cost
of production (labor cost plus the shadow price of intermediate goods, w + λm
t )
equals the expected next period value of the output (the shadow price), Et−1λc
t.
Denoting [α, ¯ α] as the support of the innovation in demand (ε) and denoting
zt ≡ Et−1s1t = y1t + s1t−1 −
¡
Et−1θt − ¯ λ
¢
as the optimal target level of inventory holdings such that the ﬁrm will stock out










(θt − y1t − s1t−1)f(ε)dε,
where λc = ¯ λ with probability
R z
α f(ε)dε if there is no stockout (i.e., case A1), and
λc = θ − c with probability
R ¯ α
z f(ε)dε if there is a stockout (i.e., case B1). Note
in the latter case optimal consumption is determined by ct = y1t + s1t−1.G i v e n
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where Γ() is a nonlinear but monotonically decreasing function of z.8 Since z is
proportional to y1 by deﬁnition, the higher y1, the less likely there is a stockout in






f(ε)dε + zf(z) − zf(z) < 0.
Also note that ¯ λ = β(w + βa) (see proposition 3.3 for proof) and λm ≥ βa, hence
Γ(¯ α)=¯ λ <w+ λm < ¯ λ − α = Γ(α),
where the lower support, α < 0, is an arbitrarily negative number. This implies that the solution
for a cut-oﬀ value z exists and is unique.
11period t, given expected demand Et−1θt. Thus equation (8) implicitly determines
the optimal level of ﬁnal goods production, y1t,i np e r i o dt − 1.
Turning to the left-hand side of equation (8), the price of intermediate goods
(λm) depends on the tightness of the intermediate goods market. Hence zt is time
dependent if λm
t is. There are two cases to consider for the possible values of λm:
Case A2. The demand for intermediate goods (y1) is below “normal”. In this
case we have s2t ≥ 0a n dπm
t = 0. Hence equation (4) implies that intermediate




where the right side is derived based on equation (5). The rationale for this
endogenously constant (sticky) price when demand is below a threshold level
is similar to that discussed above regarding the ﬁnished goods price λc.T h e
interpretation for βa is, in case there is no stockout, the ﬁrm gets to save on
the marginal cost of production next period, and the discounted value for this is
precisely βa. In this case, equation (8) implies that the optimal target inventory
level zt based on period t−1 information is also a constant: zt = k, where k solves
Γ(k)=w+βa. This implies that the optimal demand for intermediate goods (y1)
is determined by the equation,




Et−1θt − ¯ λ
¢
+( k − s1t−1). (9)
Hence, the optimal demand of intermediate goods by a downstream (ﬁnished-
goods producing) ﬁrm is characterized by a policy that speciﬁes a constant target
level for ﬁnished-goods inventory holdings (k = Et−1s1t)o rat a r g e tl e v e lo fi n v e n -
tory investment (k − s1t−1), such that orders (purchases) of intermediate goods
move one-for-one with expected consumption demand (Et−1θt − ¯ λ)g i v e nt h et a r -
get inventory investment level (k − s1t−1), provided that we are in case A2 (i.e.,
provided there is no stockout in the intermediate goods market: s2t ≥ 0). Using
equation (7), the requirement s2t ≥ 0 implies that the threshold level of expected
demand that determines the probability of stockout in the intermediate goods
market is given by,
y2t + s2t−1 − y1t ≥ 0,
or equivalently, by
Et−1θt − ¯ λ ≤ y2t + s2t−1 − (k − s1t−1),
12w h e r ew eh a v es u b s t i t u t e do u ty1t using the optimal policy (9). That is, if optimal
expected demand for ﬁnished goods (which equals consumption demand, Et−1ct =
Et−1θt−¯ λ, plus inventory investment demand, k−s1t−1)i sl e s st h a nt h ep o t e n t i a l
supply of ﬁnished goods (which equals the total supply of intermediate goods,
y2t + s2t−1), then some intermediate goods should be kept as inventories (i.e.,
s2t ≥ 0) and the optimal volume of orders (usages) for intermediate goods is
characterized by the policy (9). Since demand equals supply in equilibrium, policy
(9) is also the policy for production of ﬁnished goods (y1 = f(m,l)) given expected
demand for ﬁnished goods.
Case B2. The demand for intermediate goods is above “normal”. In this case,
the supply of intermediate goods cannot meet its demand. Hence, s2t =0a n d
πm
t > 0, implying that there is a stockout in intermediate goods. Hence, the
optimal volume of orders for intermediate goods in equilibrium is simply
y1t = y2t + s2t−1.
In this case, the tightness in the intermediate goods market pushes goods price
upwards, so that λm
t = βa+πm
t > βa. Clearly, whether the economy is in case A2
or case B2 depends not only on expected demand shock in period t − 1( Et−1θt),
but also on the availability (production) of intermediate goods (y2t+s2t−1), which
is determined earlier in history (period t − 2).
To determine the optimal supply of intermediate goods (y2)a n dt h eo p t i m a l
orders for raw materials (n)i np e r i o dt − 2 based on expected demand for inter-
mediate goods, the planner needs to compute the total demand for intermediate
goods (= input demand as factors of production by upstream ﬁrms plus inventory
investment demand for intermediate goods). Equation (5) shows that y2t should be
chosen such that the marginal cost of production, a, equals the expected next pe-
riod value of marginal product (the shadow price of intermediate goods), Et−2λm
t .
Since λm depends on the tightness of the intermediate goods market (as discussed
above under case A2 and case B2), there are two possibilities to consider. In the
case A2, λm = βa. In the case B2, λm = Et−1λc − w = Et−1(θt − ct) − w (by
equations 3 and 1).
Denote
ζt ≡ Et−2s2t
= y2t + s2t−1− Et−2(k − s1t−1)
| {z }
0
−(Et−2θt − ¯ λ)
= y2t + s2t−1 − (Et−2θt − ¯ λ)
13as the optimal target level of inventory holdings for intermediate goods such that
the ﬁrm stocks out if and only if εt−1 ≥ ζ.9 In equation (5), the expected price
of intermediate goods based on information available in period t − 2c a nt h e nb e









(Et−1θt − Et−1ct − w)f(ε)dε, (10)
where the ﬁrst term represents the probability of case A2 and the second rep-
resents the probability of case B2. Equation (10) implicitely determines ζt and
consequently the optimal production policy for y2.T h e f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n
shows that the optimal solution for ζt is a constant.
Proposition 3.1. The optimal target for intermediate goods inventory stock is
a constant, ζt = e k.
Proof. See Appendix 001.¥
Hence by the deﬁnition of ζ we have
y2t =
¡
Et−2θt − ¯ λ
¢
+( e k − s2t−1). (11)
Equation (11) says that in equilibrium the optimal production plan for interme-
diate goods (y2) is to meet the expected consumption demand (Et−2θt − ¯ λ)p l u s
a target level for inventory investment in intermediate goods (e k − s2t−1). Notice
that this is very similar to the policy of choosing ﬁnished goods production (y1t)
in equation (9) except in this case the possibility of a stockout in the raw material
market is not considered here in the model (extending the model to include such
a possibility is straightforward).
Proposition 3.2. The optimal target for intermediate goods inventories is higher
than that for ﬁnished goods inventories,
e k>k .
9Note that in the above expression, the equilibrium concept, Et−2s1t−1 = Et−1s1t = k, is
applied because the optimal supply of intermediate goods (y2) in any period should always be
chosen such that not only does intermediate goods inventory level meet its target but also does
the ﬁnished goods inventory level (whose expected target is k in any period as shown previously).
14Proof. See Appendix 002.¥
The intuition behind proposition 2 can be understood as follows. The proba-
bility of a stockout in period t in the ﬁnal consumption goods market is aﬀected
by the supply of ﬁnished goods (y1t = f(m,l)) determined in period t − 1, which
in turn is aﬀected by the demand and supply of intermediate goods as well as
by the demand and supply of raw materials (y2t = g(n)) in the primary goods
market determined in period t − 2. Hence, in a multi-stage production economy
equilibrium consumption depends ultimately on the production decisions made
by the most remote upstream ﬁrms at the start of the production chain which
supplies intermediate goods to downstream ﬁrms. However, because stocking out
and holding inventories are both costly, in order to determine optimally how much
to produce at the upstream, ﬁrms must form correct expectations on ﬁnal demand
f a c i n gt h em o s tr e m o t ed o w n s t r e a m .T h el o n g e rt h ec h a i no fp r o d u c t i o n( i . e . ,t h e
larger the number of production stages), the harder it is to forecast ﬁnal demand
at downstream, hence the more precautionary inventory investment it is needed
in order to avoid possible stockouts.
Proposition 3.3. The equilibrium decision rules for consumption (c), ﬁnished
goods inventory holding (s1), ﬁnished goods production (y1) - which also equals
equilibrium usage of intermediate goods (m), intermediate goods production (y2)
— which also equals equilibrium demand of raw materials (n), and intermediate





k − εt ; if εt ≤ k & εt−1 ≤ e k
e k − εt − ρεt−1 ; if εt ≤ k & εt−1 > e k





Et−1θt − ¯ λ + εt ; if εt ≤ k
Et−1θt − ¯ λ + k ; if εt >k& εt−1 ≤ e k
Et−2θt − ¯ λ + e k ; if εt >k& εt−1 > e k
y1t =

   
   
Et−1θt − ¯ λ + εt−1 ; if εt−1 ≤ k & εt−2 ≤ e k
Et−1θt − ¯ λ + k − e k + εt−1 + ρεt−2 ; if εt−1 ≤ k & εt−2 > e k
Et−1θt − ¯ λ + k ; if k<εt−1 ≤ e k
Et−2θt − ¯ λ + e k ; if εt−1 > e k
15s2t =

   
   
e k − εt−1 − ρεt−2 ; if εt−1 ≤ k & εt−2 ≤ e k
2e k − k − (1 + ρ)εt−1 − ρεt−2 ; if εt−1 ≤ k & εt−2 > e k
e k − k − ρεt−1 ; if k<εt−1 ≤ e k
0; if εt−1 >k
y2t =

   
   
Et−2θt − ¯ λ + εt−2 + ρεt−3 ; if εt−2 ≤ k & εt−3 ≤ e k
Et−2θt − ¯ λ + k − e k +( 1+ρ)εt−2 + ρεt−3 ; if εt−2 ≤ k & εt−3 > e k
Et−2θt − ¯ λ + k + ρεt−2 ; if k<εt−2 ≤ e k
Et−2θt − ¯ λ + e k ; if εt−2 > e k
where ¯ λ = β(w + βa).
Proof. See Appendix 003.¥
The interpretation for ¯ λ = β(w + βa) is reasonably straightforward. Given
that the slackness constraint for ﬁnished goods does not bind in the current period
(hence the slackness constraint for intermediate goods will not bind in the next
period according to proposition 3.2), the expected value of carrying one extra unit
of ﬁnished goods inventory into the next period is determined by two terms: ﬁrst,
it can save on the labor cost of production next period (w); second, it can save
on the intermediate goods used in production whose expected value next period
equals the discounted marginal cost of raw materials (βa) given that the slackness
constraint on intermediate goods does not bind next period. The present value
of this compounded marginal cost is then β(w + βa). Hence ¯ λ is simply the
competitive price of ﬁnished goods when the economy has inventories.
4. Understanding Inventory Fluctuations
The following propositions characterize some important implications of the model
for inventory ﬂuctuations. To ﬁx concepts, note that for ﬁnished goods sector,
the production is y1t and the sales are ct; for intermediate goods sector, the usage
is mt(= y1t), and the orders are y2t (note that the one period production time for
transforming n into y2 can also be interpreted as a delivery time during which
n units of goods are delivered from an upstream ﬁrm to an intermediate-goods
producing ﬁrm which can produce ﬁnished goods instantaneously). Since we do
not consider inventories of raw materials (n) in this model, the usage in n equals
the orders of n. Extending the model to a 3-stage-fabrication economy to allow
16for raw material inventories is straightforward. To facilitate the proofs, we denote
P ≡ Pr[εt ≤ k]a n de P ≡ Pr[εt ≤ e k]. Clearly, e P>Psince e k>k .
Proposition 4.1. The variance of output exceeds the variance of sales for ﬁn-
ished goods, and the variance of orders exceeds the variance of usages for inter-
mediate goods, provided that demand shocks are positively autocorrelated.
Proof. See Appendix 004.¥
The intuition for this proposition is reasonably straightforward. If we can
understand why production (y1)i sm o r ev a r i a b l et h a ns a l e s( c), then we can also
understand why orders (y2) are more variable than usages (y1), because usages
are like demand (sales) and orders are equivalent to supply (production).
Since optimal production under demand uncertainty is to meet expected sales
plus the target inventory investment, output will respond to an innovation in
sales by more than one-for-one. This is because a positive demand shock has
two eﬀects: it reduces inventories one-for-one, and it increases expected demand.
The ﬁrst eﬀect alone would make production exactly as volatile as sales in order
to replenish the inventory stock; the second eﬀect further increases production if
demand shocks are serially correlated (ρ > 0) so that the expected next period
shock is strictly positive. This important insight has already been provided by
Kahn (1987) using a single-stage production partial equilibrium model of output
inventories. Here it is shown that it continues to hold in a general equilibrium
multi-stage production model.
Since production of ﬁnished goods (y1) requires intermediate goods (m)a s
input (y1 = f(m,l)), the volatility in sales at the very bottom of the production
chain is translated into volatility in production (σ2
y1), which in turn is translated
into volatility in sales (σ2
m) from the upstream ﬁrms which supply intermediate
goods to downstream as inputs. The transmission and ampliﬁcation of uncertainty
continues until the most remote upstream ﬁrms are reached. Hence the variance of
production/orders exceeds the variance of sales/usages at all stages of production
and the variances keep increasing along the chain of production towards upstream
ﬁrms.
This chain-multiplier eﬀect thus explains why in the US production of raw ma-
terials at upstream ﬁrms is usually about 50 percent more volatile than production
of ﬁnished goods at downstream ﬁrms.
Proposition 4.2. Productions (as well as sales) are positively correlated across
all stages of fabrication.
17Proof. See Appendix 005.¥
This proposition simply explains a well known phenomenon of sectorial co-
movements observed in the US economy. In the existing RBC literature, such
comovements are explained by aggregate technology shocks (see Hornstein, 2000,
for detailed discussions on why sectorial technology shocks cannot explain such
comovements). Here is it is shown that such comovements may be explained also
by demand shocks to the downstream production sector.
Proposition 4.3. Input inventories are uncorrelated with but more volatile than
output inventories.
Proof. See Appendix 006.¥
The puzzle that inventories of materials and good-in-progress are signiﬁcantly
more volatile than but essentially uncorrelated with inventories of ﬁnished goods
was ﬁrst documented by Feldstein and Auerbach (1976), but it has never been
explained in the literature. The multi-stage production model oﬀers a clear-cut
explanation for this puzzle. The reason for the volatility diﬀerence between the
two types of inventories is that uncertainty in ﬁnal demand gets transmitted and
ampliﬁed along the chain of production towards upstream. Hence inventories held
by upstream ﬁrms (i.e., intermediate-goods inventories) are more volatile than
inventories held by downstream ﬁrms (i.e., ﬁnished-goods inventories) due to the
chain-multiplier eﬀect. The reason for the weak correlation between the two types
of inventories is that systematic changes in ﬁnal demand (e.g., E(θt)) are picked
up by production while only noise components in demand (i.e., the innovations,
ε) are picked up by inventories because any systematic (forecastable) changes
in inventories would have been immediately replenished by production/orders
according to the optimal inventory targeting policies. Since the noise contained
in the two types of inventories reﬂect demand innovations in diﬀerent time periods,
they are thus uncorrelated.
5. Conclusion
This paper oﬀers a general equilibrium multi-stage production model to explain
the co-existence and co-movement of output and input inventories, and provides
a neoclassical perspective on the propagation mechanism of demand uncertainty.
It reveals that uncertainty in demand at downstream can be transmitted and
18ampliﬁed towards upstream by inventory investment at all stages of production
via input-output linkages, leading to a chain-multiplier eﬀect on aggregate output
and employment. The model is capable of explaining several long-standing puz-
zles of the business cycle associated with inventories. Since the chain-multiplier
reﬂects nothing more than optimal responses of a perfectly functioning market
economy towards demand uncertainty, interventionary policies attempting to re-
duce aggregate output and employment volatilities via demand management may
prove counter-productive, unless the policies can be targeted speciﬁcally at reduc-
ing demand uncertainty or shortening the time lags involved in ﬁrms’ production
decisions.
The model may be extended to explain durable goods inventories and sea-
sonal cycles in production and inventories. It is well know that the durable goods
sector is far more volatile than the nondurable goods sector and that seasonal
movements in production and inventories are much larger than business-cycle fre-
quency movements. These stylized facts have not been well explained by theories.
Clearly, durability of consumption goods and seasonal demand at Christmas can
only be modeled through preferences. The general equilibrium inventory model
with preference shifts outlined in this paper provides a suitable framework for
addressing these issues in the future.
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(θt − y1t − s1t−1)f(ε)dε.





































where y1t = y2t + s2t−1 since s2t =0i fεt−1 > ζ. Assuming that ζ >k(see
proposition 3.2 for a conﬁrmation of this assumption), hence εt−1 > ζ implies
εt−1 >k ,w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e ss1t−1 = ˙ 0. Then conditioned on εt−1 > ζ, the







































































23where Ω2 is a set of ﬁxed parameters. This equation implies that the optimal
inventory target (ζt) for intermediate goods is a constant that solves the identity
e Γ(ζt,Ω2)=a.¥
Appendix 002 (proof for proposition 3.2):
Finished goods inventory stock satisﬁes
s1t =
½
y1t + s1t−1 − (θt − ¯ λ); i f εt ≤ k
0; i f εt >k .
Since the optimal production for y1t satisﬁes
y1t =
(
(Et−1θt − ¯ λ)+( k − s1t−1); i f εt−1 ≤ e k
y2t + s2t−1 ;i fεt−1 > e k
and the optimal production for y2t satisﬁes






(Et−1θt − ¯ λ)+k − (θt − ¯ λ); i f εt ≤ k & εt−1 ≤ e k
(Et−2θt − ¯ λ)+e k + s1t−1 − (θt − ¯ λ); i f εt ≤ k & εt−1 > e k





k − εt ;i fεt ≤ k & εt−1 ≤ e k
s1t−1 + e k − εt − ρεt−1 ;i fεt ≤ k & εt−1 > e k
0; i f εt >k
Notice that the lagged variable (s1t−1) can be further iterated backwards using





k − εt−1 ;i fεt−1 ≤ k & εt−2 ≤ e k
s1t−2 + e k − εt−1 − ρεt−2 ;i fεt−1 ≤ k & εt−2 > e k
0; i f εt−1 >k
,
which can lead to inﬁnite regression, resulting in the series {s1t} being nonsta-
tionary. This cannot be an equilibrium unless
s1t−1 =0
24always holds. But this requires that the condition, εt−1 >k ,always hold so that
s1t−1 = 0 with probability one (the third line in the above equation for s1t−1).
However, given the second line in the equation for s1t,
s1t = s1t−1 + e k − εt − ρεt−1 ;i fεt ≤ k & εt−1 > e k ,
if the condition, e k>k ,holds, then εt−1 > e k automatically implies εt−1 >k ,which
in turn implies (by the third line in the equation for s1t−1)






k − εt ;i fεt ≤ k & εt−1 ≤ e k
e k − εt − ρεt−1 ;i fεt ≤ k & εt−1 > e k
0; i f εt >k
,
which is stationary and is therefore an equilibrium. Hence, e k>kmust be true.¥
Appendix 003 (proof for proposition 3.3):
The decision rule for s1t is proved in the proof for proposition 3.2. The rest can
be obtained by following the discussions in section 3 above using straightforward
substitutions. To show that ¯ λ = β(w +βa), note λc
t = ¯ λ if εt ≤ k (i.e., if πc
t =0 ) .
On the other hand, since the current period shadow price of intermediate goods
is known based on last period information set, as all variables in the resource





t+1.S i n c e λm
t = βa if εt−1 ≤ e k according equation (4) and equation (5),10 we
have λm
t+1 = βa if εt ≤ e k. A c c o r d i n gt op r o p o s i t i o n3 . 2 ,k<e k, hence λc
t = ¯ λ
implies λm
t+1 = βa (since εt ≤ k implies εt ≤ e k) . A c c o r d i n gt oe q u a t i o n( 3 ) ,
Etλc
t+1 = w + λm
t+1, substituting this into equation (2) gives
λc
t = β(w + λm
t+1)=β(w + βa), if εt ≤ k.
¥
Appendix 004 (proof for proposition 4.1):
We need to show σy2 > σy1 > σc. Using the law of motion for preference








ε)+( 1− P)e Pρ
2σ
2




10Equation (5) implies Et−1λm
t+1 = a.
25T h ev a r i a n c eo fy1 is given by
σ
2






























And the variance of y2 is given by
σ
2













































All terms in these expressions are strictly positive. Notice that the last two terms
in σ2
y exceed the last two terms in σ2
c. Hence, σy1 > σc if and only if the ﬁrst two
terms in σ2
y exceed the ﬁrst term in σ2












































where the ﬁrst term is the same as the right-hand side of the inequality, hence
σ2
y > σ2
c as long as ρ > 0. In order to show σy2 > σy1, ﬁr s tn o t i c et h a tb o t h
σ2
y2 and σ2
y1 are increasing functions of ρ. Secondly, notice that if ρ =0 , then
σ2
y2 = σ2
y1 = P e Pσ2
ε + P(1 − e P)σ2
ε. And thirdly, notice that if ρ =1 ,t h e n
σ
2


















+(1 − P)e Pσ
2
θ



































+(1 − e P)σ
2
θ,
and clearly each term in σ2
y2 exceeds the corresponding term in σ2
y1. Hence, as
long as ρ > 0, we have σy2 > σy1 > σc.¥
Appendix 005 (proof for proposition 4.2):
Eye-ball inspection on the decision rules indicates that every possible case for
c in the decision rule (sales of ﬁnished goods) is strictly positively correlated with
e v e r yp o s s i b l ec a s ef o rm(= y1, sales of intermediate goods), and every possible
case for y1 in the decision rule (production of ﬁnished goods) is strictly positively
correlated with every possible case for y2 (production of intermediate goods).
Hence productions as well as sales are unambiguously positively correlated across
all stages of fabrication. Furthermore, these correlations increase with ρ since
Et−jθt = ρjθt−j.¥
Appendix 006 (proof for proposition 4.3):
Note that the only term in s1t that is correlated with terms in s2t is εt−1.
Hence we need only to consider the case where
s1t = e k − εt − ρεt−1 ;i fεt ≤ k & εt−1 > e k .
However, given e k>k ,t h eo n l yc a s ei ns2t that meets the condition, εt−1 > e k,
which supports the above case for s1t is
s2t = 0; i f εt−1 >k.
Hence the two types of inventories are uncorrelated. The variances of the two
types of inventories, on the other hand, are given respectively by
σ
2
s1 = P e Pσ
2



























Term-by-term comparison shows that σs2 > σs1 as long as ρ > 0 (the variances
are equal if ρ =0 ) . ¥
27Fig. 1. Stage-of-Fabrication Model Diagram.
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